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Abstract 
This study investigates normative dimensions of speech acts. It analyzes the nature of normative 
dimension of speech acts.To get empirical data, 9 participants were chosen as sources of spoken 
language data: 2 tuan guru giving speeches in formal contexts; and 7 people engaging in casual 
conversations in informal context. To collect data, observation and voice recording was used. Prior to 
analysis, the data were transcribed, labeled and classified according to categories that appeared from 
the data. Findings reveal and advocate the normative and moral dimensions of speech acts generated 
from agent’s change normative standing to hearers in terms of right, obligation and responsibility. As a 
result, the study argues that moral values embedded in speech act performance such honesty, truth, self-
control and respect, obedience and so forth could be taught in order to foster children good character 
development in comprehensive ways including moral reasoning, affection and behaviors. For that 
reason, moral values teaching based on speech act normativity and morality could be used as an arena 
for bearing good character corresponding to the process of acquiring of the first language or learning 
the second/foreign language. This could be a starting point for teaching moral competence through 
language institution that are more affordable, accessible and learnable for all rational human being all 
over the world. Furthermore, those moral values might be the foundation for moral action of children to 
bear the awareness of good interpersonal or intersubjective relationship. Based on the limitation of the 
study, it needs to hold further study as to the practical model of teaching moral values on the bases of 
moral values embedded in performing speech acts. 
Keywords: speech acts, normative dimensions, moral teaching 
 
Abstrak 
Kajian ini menelaah tentang karakter dimensi normatif tindakan berbahasa. Data empiris diperoleh 
dengan melibatkan 9 partisipan, yakni 2 tuan guru yang memberikan ceramah dalam konteks formal dan 
7 orang yang terlibat percakapan kasual dalam konteks informal. Data dikumpulkan melalui observasi 
dan rekaman suara. Sebelum analisa, data tersebut ditranskripsi, dilabeli dan diklasifikasikan. Kajian ini 
mengungkapkan dan mendukung  adanya dimensi normatif dan moral tindakan berbahasa yang dibentuk 
dari perubahan kedudukan normatif pembicara dan pendengar terkait hak, kewajiban dan tanggungjawab. 
Kajian ini mendukung bahwa dimensi normatif dan nilai moral yang melekat dalam setiap tindakan 
berbahasa seperti, kejujuran, kebenaran, komitmen, tanggungjawab, kontrol diri, saling menghargai dan 
lain-lain yang bisa diajarkan  dalam pengembangan karakter anak yang bermoral dengan cara yang 
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komprehensif meliputi penalaran moral, afeksi dan tindakan. Oleh sebab itulah, pengajaran nilai-nilai 
moral berbasis moralitas dan normativitas tindakan berbahasa bisa digunakan sebagai arena pendidikan 
karakter atau nilai. Ini bisa menjadi langkah awal pengajaran kompetensi moral melalui instiusi bahasa. 
Di samping itu, nilai-nilai moral tersebut merupakan fondasi dalam tindakan anak yang bermoral untuk 
membangun kesadaran interpersonal anak yang baik. Berdasarkan keterbatasan kajian ini, diperlukan 
kajian lebih lanjut tentang model praktis pengajaran nilai-nilai moral berbasis dimensi normatif dan 
moral yang inheren dalam setiap tindakan berbahasa. 
Kata kunci: tindakan berbasa, dimensi normatif, pembelajaran moral 
 
1. Introduction  
Language is not only a means of 
communication, but also a means of 
value or moral education. The latter 
nature of  language in the sense of 
normative dimensions of speech acts 
has attracted language philosophers and 
linguists (Searle, 2001; Alston, 2000; 
Cuneo, 2014)  to delve into such 
dimensions. Based on universal nature 
of language, it is in need of studying 
such normative dimensions of Sasak 
language. 
Sasak language is mostly spoken 
in Lombok Island, West Nusa 
Tenggara, Indonesia, near to the East 
region of Bali. Sasak language has five 
dialects: a) Ngeno-ngene, in the Central 
West coast and the Central East to the 
North East coast; b) Meno-mene, 
around Puyung and Praya, and in the 
East Lombok; c) Ngeto-ngete, around 
Suralaga, and Sembalun in the North 
East: d) Kuto-kute, around Bayan 
region and in the North; and e) Meriaq-
meriku, in the South central area around 
Bonjeruk, and Sengkol. 
This study concerned their nature 
of normative and moral dimensions of 
illocutionary acts by using samples of 
Tuan Guru (a competently-religious 
teacher who are colletively recognized 
and accepted by society)speeches and 
casual conversations of Meno-mene 
dialect in the South Sikur village. In this 
area, local people speak Sasak language 
as their mother tongue and Indonesian 
as their second language. 
The South Sikur villagers are 
bilingual community. Sasak language, 
Meno-mene dialect, is used in daily 
communication with one another at 
home, in and around the Mosque, and 
other domains. These people speak 
Indonesian in formal setting and at 
school. Indonesian is also used when 
meeting with new comers.  
Language is an utterance that has 
a communicative and performative 
function. This fact is Austin’s 
underlying assumption in generating his 
speech act theory. A locutionary act is 
produced by saying something and an 
illocutionary act is by doing something. 
Austin’s initiation led opponents and 
proponents to dispute on the nature and 
elements of speech acts. One of the 
most argued unit is the nature of 
illocutionary acts. Some believe 
illocutionary act (IA) is the basis of rule 
or conventional act such as Austin 
(1962), Sbisa (2001), Searle (1969), and 
Vanderveken (1991). On the contrary, 
others hold, it is grounded on intention 
or inference-based act like Grice 
(1989), Strawson (1971), Schiffer 
(1972), Bach and Harnish (1981), and 
Kissine (2013). Given these different 
views, both sides have developed 
speech act theory in different ways. For 
instance, the criteria for speech act 
typology are based on illocutionary 
force and propositional attitude. 
Regarding with such tensions, the 
identification of these types of speech 
acts in Sasak language is needed.  
23 | Mabasan, Vol. 12, No. 1, Januari--Juni 2018: 21--42 
 
 
 
The dispute on the role of attitude 
as the ground for distinguishing the 
types of illocutionary acts breaks down, 
since not every act has attitude uttered. 
For this reason, efforts of developing 
and exploring the normativity of speech 
acts have attracted the attention of 
linguists and analytical philosophers. 
Searle’s identification about the 
commitment that consists in 
illocutionary act is under desire-
independent reason for action (DIRA) 
on the bases of conceptual apparatus 
like direction of fit, intention and the 
rest. Searle’s idea on reasons for action 
is different from othe classical 
philosopher (William, 1981; Davidson, 
1968). For Searle, the main features of 
DIRA are naturalistic, intentional, 
binding, and motivational. This reason 
refers to commitment that is inherent in 
performing illocutionary acts. 
Dealing with Searle’s on 
commitment, Alston’s normative stance 
and Cuneo normative standing, it is 
important to identify and examine 
profoundly the types of normative and 
moral dimensions of speech acts in 
Sasak speech community. In addition, 
having moral dimension is 
representation of moral values of 
speech act that might be used for moral 
or character education. 
Their notions have contributed 
into the normative state of speech act. 
However, for Searle, the commitment 
that is consisted in speech acts has 
nothing to do with moral domain, while 
in Austin’s account the role of social 
pressures is the main source for the 
existence of normative stance of a given 
act. Searle’s ignorance of moral issue, a 
person’s point of view, interpersonal 
communication in the case of 
commitment like obligation, 
responsibility in performing speech act 
is inconsistent with the nature of 
interpersonal communication, the 
fundamental principles of morality. 
Meanwhile, Alston’s claim is lacking 
internal factors in respect to normativity 
and has no speaker clear-cut point of 
view generated in speech act 
performance. Furthermore, Cuneo just 
analyzed three types of speech acts, 
assertive, commissive and imperatives, 
thus his account need to be extended to 
other types like expressive and 
declarative. Even the sample provided 
are limited and based on intuition. For 
these reason, the types of any category 
have any subtypes having special 
normative standing could be extended 
by analyzing empirical data for proving 
more adequate description on the 
normative and moral dimension of 
speech acts.  
 Based on these accounts, it is 
crucial to reanalyze and explore the 
normative and moral dimensions of 
speech acts that are universal in nature. 
Extension and reexamination on the 
natures of such normativity and 
morality of speech acts are needed in 
regard to speech acts’ normativity and 
morality since they are completely-
complex concepts. Furthermore, moral 
values generated from moral dimension 
of speech could be identified that might 
be arena for moral or character 
education. 
In addition, relationship between 
second language acquisition and speech 
acts conducted by Blum-Kulka and 
Ohlstain (1986), Kasper and Blum-
Kulka (1993), Ellis (1992) and others 
seem to be focused only on the 
acquisition of particular speech acts 
such as promise, compliment and so 
forth as well as its relationship to 
classroom interaction. The studies are 
motivated in addressing the importance 
of improving students’sociolinguistic 
and communicative competence. 
However, in reality the problem is not 
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only about such competences, but also 
on student’s moral awareness. 
Another recent study was 
conducted by Rakoczy and Tomasello 
(2009), Lohse, Grafenhein, Behne, and 
Rakoczy (2014) which focused on 
children’s understanding of speech act 
normativity. This study seems to be 
based on psychology and concerns with 
only the role of direction of fit as a 
benchmark in analyzing children’s 
understanding of speech act 
normativity. Their findings indicate the 
significant relationship of students 
understanding such normative 
dimension with the direction of fit as the 
criterion for the condition of 
satisfaction in speech act performance. 
However, in this case, other crucial 
apparatus like the role of intentionality 
and normative standing were ignored. 
Based on the aforementioned 
gaps either in normative and moral 
dimension of speech acts and moral or 
character education, it is crucial to 
identify the types of speech acts and its 
normative and moral dimensions in 
Sasak language based on Tuan Guru 
speeches and casual conversations. 
Moreover, it is essential to extend, 
explore, and study about the nature of 
normative dimension of speech acts 
regarding to types, features, and other 
concept pertaining to normativity and 
morality of speech acts such as 
intentionality, reason for action and 
second person standpoint. This might 
be an expected starting point in moral 
teaching or character education by the 
means of language institution, which 
speech morality having moral values is 
possibly plausible for building children 
or student’s good character. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Apart from the dispute on the 
basis of speech act typology, there is 
promising and crucial dimension of 
speech acts to be investigated. Such a 
dimension is related to normative 
features of speech acts. Few studies are 
focused on theoretizing core concepts 
that have been done by Searle (2001), 
Alston (2000) and Cuneo (2014). 
Searle (2001) reveals that 
normative dimension of speech acts is 
inherent in nature. Those normative 
dimensions exist wheneever the speaker 
and hearer perform speeach acts. For 
him, that becomes the reason for action 
according the speech acts performed. 
Furthermore, that reason for action is 
commitment-based. Commitments as 
factitive entities grounded on the 
conditions of reason for actions have 
the propositional content and the 
direction of fit as its logical structure. 
Thus, such direction imposes the 
satisfaction of the commitments i.e. if 
the world matches to the content of the 
commitments (world-to-mind). Dealing 
with binding features of such 
commitments, obligations, it represents 
S’s relations to the speech act 
performed. In this respect, performing 
the acts, the agent or S creates himself 
commitments, obligation, and 
responsibility. 
In the case of desire-independent 
commitment effecting the secondary 
reason and motivation, Searle’s account 
emphasizes that the recognition 
something on a valid reason as the 
ground for acting is to recognize the 
factitive entities in terms of  S as subject 
and upward direction of fit. For Searle, 
such desire-independent reason 
commitment leading the motivation can 
be understood by means of relationship 
between third person and the first 
person viewpoint, not by way of a 
matter of causally sufficient condition. 
From the third point of views, people 
have a set of institutional structure 
binding the members by deontic 
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structure by their given institution. 
Meanwhile, in the first person point of 
view, I myself create such DIRA 
voluntarily and intentionally (Searle, 
2001). In this case, the institutional 
structure has nothing to do with how we 
create such deontic power, but only 
provide the possibility condition for I or 
agent to perform those commitment and 
obligation. 
However, Searle deny the role of 
second person standpoint. This is 
different from Darwall (2006, 2010, 
2011, 2013) argue that agent can be 
morally obliged to do action by way of 
second person standpoint. For Darwal, 
the second person standpoint is bound 
agent practical authority that is related 
to morality, respect and accountability. 
Moreover, the second person standpoint 
represents the relationship between 
rationality and morality. It seems 
plausible that in some cases of speech 
act performance having normative and 
moral dimension take second person 
standpoint in order to create practical 
reason for action. Furthermore, it seem 
to be more straightforward for agent 
that has moral obligation to give 
reactive attitude to the given speech act 
by S or H. 
Under other conditions, Alston 
(2001) extends Searle’s necessary 
condition of making promise to form 
the normative stance of taking 
responsibility in a given act. Alston’s 
account on the normative aspect of 
speech act embedded in illocutionary 
act includes taking responsibility for 
conditions of satisfaction and rule-
subjection acts. The rule is prescribed 
socially. In this case, R’s in performing 
illocutionary act, it is not individual 
variation but interpersonal case. Thus 
for Alston, R that p is related to give 
one’s utterance normative state in 
community (Alston, 2001:59). 
Moreover, in assertion p it represents 
putting oneself to reproach in the case 
of being believed that p. In this regard, 
one has nothing to do with expressing 
his commitment. Rather, it is the way 
one’s behavior fit into systems of rules 
in speaker linguistic community. 
Alston’s account represents 
illocutionary act of promises which 
speaker takes responsibility for the 
preparatory condition, the truth, and 
conventional effect. Furthermore, it 
describes that IA as rule based. To 
Alston, utterance made from IA consist 
in normative fact rather than speaker 
belief or intention. In addition to Alston 
extension on description of the 
condition for other IA type, like order, 
request, thanks, and excercitive will not 
be described (see Alston, p. 71--72). 
Alston’s account on the 
normative aspect of speech act 
embedded in illocutionary act includes 
taking responsibility for conditions of 
satisfaction and rule-subjection acts. 
His claim on such states is grounded on 
a number of candidate analyses in 
expounding the notion of taking 
responsibility (R’ing) as follow: 
D5.  In uttering S, U R’d that p—in 
uttering S, U knowingly took 
on a liability to blame in case 
of not-p. 
D6. In uttering S, U R’d that p—U 
recognized herself to be 
rightfully subject to blame , 
etc., in case of not-p. 
D7. In uttering S, U R’d that p—in 
uttering S, U knowingly took 
on liability to being incorrect 
in case of not-p. 
D8. In uttering S, U R’d that p—in 
uttering S, U subjects his 
utterance to a rule that, in 
application to this case, 
implies that it is permissible 
for U to utter S only if p. 
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D9. U R’s that p in uttering S—In 
uttering S, U purports to know 
that p. 
D10. U R’s that p in uttering S—In 
uttering S, U represents p as 
being the case. 
Alston’s aim is to extend Searle’s 
concept on the condition of satisfaction 
in promising H to do action. In this 
respect, he argues that U is not the only 
one who take responsibility for 
unsatisfied condition of satisfaction 
(Alston example see: 54). That is to say, 
though the condition is satisfied on the 
basis of Searle’s condition 4 or 6, it 
remain unsatisfied the condition in U 
takes responsibility to blame or U 
recognize to be rightfully subject to 
blame in case of not-p D5 and D6. 
The rule is prescribed socially. In 
this case, R’s in performing 
illocutionary act, it is not individual 
variation but interpersonal case. Thus 
for Alston, R that p is related to give 
one’s utterance normative state in 
community. Moreover, in assertion p it 
represents putting oneself to reproach in 
the case of being believed that p. In this 
regard, one has nothing to do with 
expressing his commitment. Rather, it is 
the way one’s behavior fit into systems 
of rules in speaker linguistic 
community. 
Since in uttering sentence one has 
no liability by virtue of inadequate 
belief that C or incorrect that not-C, 
Alston suggests another D8 analysis 
putting one’s utterance under subjection 
to a rule that require C. In D8, it 
presents one’s utterance that is 
dependent on the rule in the case of 
permissible utterance that p. By this 
rule, Alston argues the distinction 
between objective and subjective 
obligation can be identified. That is to 
say one may do something with C is 
satisfied, then it is right in objective 
way. Even if one may do something that 
C is not satisfied, it is wrong in 
objective way, but it is right in 
subjective way. That is similar case to 
when C is satisfied, but S does not 
believe it, then S does not do it. As a 
result, one is wrong in objective but 
right in subjective way. Such 
phenomena support Alston to claim that 
blameworthiness and epistemic position 
that S is blame to… is a kind of 
subjective wrongness. 
By extension Searle and Alston 
and on the bases of moral realist, Cuneo 
(2014) argues that the normative 
dimensions of speech acts exist by way 
of agent’ having right, obligation and 
responsibility. These normative 
standings are altered by agent to H 
when performing illocutionary act by 
uttering locutionary acts. Furthermore, 
for Cuneo, the normative dimensions of 
speech acts are also moral. In this 
respect, his claim is that some of 
normative features embedded to speech 
acts are moral since they have moral 
aspect such as moral right, obligation 
and responsibility. 
 
The rule is prescribed socially. In 
this case, R’s in performing 
illocutionary act, it is not individual 
variation but interpersonal case. Thus 
for Alston, R that p is related to give 
one’s utterance normative state in 
community (ibid.59). Moreover, in 
assertion p it represents putting oneself 
to reproach in the case of being believed 
that p. In this regard, one has nothing to 
do with expressing his commitment. 
Rather, it is the way one’s behavior fit 
into systems of rules in speaker 
linguistic community. 
Since in uttering sentence one has 
no liability by virtue of inadequate 
belief that C or incorrect that not-C, 
Alston suggests another D8 analysis 
putting one’s utterance under subjection 
to a rule that require C. In D8, it 
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presents one’s utterance that is 
dependent on the rule in the case of 
permissible utterance that p. By this 
rule, Alston argues the distinction 
between objective and subjective 
obligation can be identified (ibid.). That 
is to say one may do something with C 
is satisfied, then it is right in objective 
way. Even if one may do something that 
C is not satisfied, it is wrong in 
objective way, but it is right in 
subjective way. That is similar case to 
when C is satisfied, but S does not 
believe it, then S does not do it. As a 
result, one is wrong in objective but 
right in subjective way. Such 
phenomena support Alston to claim that 
blameworthiness and epistemic position 
that S is blame to… is a kind of 
subjective wrongness. 
Searle's and Alston's view of 
normative stance highlighting the 
speaker, as for Cuneo's either the S or 
the H is bound by the normativity of 
speech act. Furthermore, the normative 
dimension encompasses the three 
related concepts such as right, 
obligation and responsibility. The 
normative dimension of speech counts 
actual or conditional right, actual and 
conditional generated obligation and 
responsibility (see Cuneo: 29--43). By 
these principles, Cuneo's propose is a 
comprehensive concept of the 
normative dimension of speech acts, 
especially in case of assertives, 
commissives, and imperatives. His 
notions are more adequate than that of 
Searle's (2001) and Alston's (2000) 
arguing that normative featuresonly 
refer to commitment and responsibility 
respectively. 
In addition, Cuneo had rejected 
the perlocutionary intention' view 
believing that some normative 
dimensions are derived from speech 
acts. As for his argument, if normative 
dimensions are generated from speech 
acts, it is not important to explain the 
normative theory of speech acts. This 
position seems to be underpinned by his 
belief that the performance of speech 
acts is subject to agents’ having right, 
obligation and responsibility. Such 
normative standing exist when the S 
alter his normative standing to the H or 
the audiences. 
Another crucial claim by Cuneo is 
that the normative dimensions of speech 
acts are moral. In this respect, some 
normative dimensions have moral 
aspects. Moral aspect of such 
normativity in case of assertive, 
commissive and imperative is the 
account that is generated for moral 
right; obligation and responsibility (see 
Cuneo: 85--97). Based on his 
statements, it differs from Searle's 
(2001) view that normative dimensions 
of speech acts have no relationship with 
moral dimensions.  
His claim that only some of 
normative dimensions have moral 
aspects is not in line with Adam's 
observation that all speech acts have 
moral dimensions. It seems that such 
notions based on philosophical 
positions taken. In Cuneo's view 
normative dimensions-- as view of a 
moral realist-- believing in pluralism is 
based on the assumption that such 
normative and moral dimensions might 
be overlapping to the concepts of 
prudential, legal, and practice based 
generating right, obligation and 
responsibility. 
However, Cuneo's claim that 
normative, moral dimensions of speech 
acts that are embedded in speech acts do 
not care about other sources of reasons 
for actions,  such as facts and intentional 
states. Such sources of reasons need to 
consider to provide an explanatory 
adequacy of speech act' argument. This 
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implies practical reasons that become 
valid reasons for an action covering 
relationships of those sources of reasons 
in speech act performance. His notion 
also needs to be extended to empirical 
cases that cover all types and subtypes 
of speech acts because some might have 
special ways for performing speech acts 
and they are successful and non-
defective grounded on normative and 
moral stance. 
Dealing with Searle’s on 
commitment, Alston’s normative stance 
and Cuneo normative standing, it is 
important to identify and examine 
profoundly the types of normative and 
moral dimensions of speech acts in 
Sasak speech community. In addition, 
having moral dimension is 
representation of moral values of 
speech act that might be used for moral 
or character education. 
Based on the theoretical 
frameworks, this study combine Searle, 
Alston and Cuneo notion on the 
normative and moral dimension of 
speech acts. Such integrated 
frameworks are used as lens to look at 
the nature of normative and moral 
dimension of speech acts. 
 
3. Research Method 
Approach used in this study is 
pragmatics, namely speech act 
analyses. In this respect, the principle of 
analyzing linguistic data for speech act 
used illocutionary act element: 
illocutionary force and the 
propositional contents as the approach 
to categorize different types of speech 
acts. Searle and Vanderveken (2005) 
account on illocutionary force 
components was applied to categorize 
types of illocutionary acts of Tuan guru 
speeches and casual conversation. 
Furthermore, other approaches are 
crucial in analyzing and examining the 
types and natures of the normative 
dimensions of speech acts, namely, 
philosophy of the mind, philosophy of 
action, and philosophical ethics. These 
approaches combined are commonly 
used in analytical linguistics, especially 
in analysis of speech act normativity. 
To collect the data, observation 
and voice recording method are applied. 
The methods chosen covered the speech 
act phenomena, dimensions of speech 
act normativity and morality grounded 
on the universality principle of 
analyzing double structure F (p) and set 
of successful conditions of each act. 
Spoken data from Tuan Guru speeches 
in formal setting and casual 
conversations in informal setting in 
South Sikur village using Meno-mene 
dialect were collected by observing and 
recording. Observation by recording 
was done for about 3 months. Tuan guru 
speech 1 was recorded on 5th August 
2015 with duration 12 minutes 58 
second. Tuan guru 2 was recorded on 9th 
September 2015 with duration 43 
minutes and 49 second. The last, casual 
conversations were recorded in 12th 
October 2015 with duration 1 hour 23 
minutes. Moreover, data recorded from 
Tuan Guru speeches and casual 
conversations in South Sikur village 
were conducted from August until 
October . The recorded data are 
transcribed into English. 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Normative Dimensions of 
Speech Acts 
Normative features of the types of 
illocutionary acts are derived from the 
normative standing of agents. 
Normative dimensions are embedded in 
speech acts and are generated from 
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these agents’ as having right, obligation 
and responsibility. These normative 
features lead the normative standing of 
the agents (the S and the H). Such 
normative standing by agents are 
generated from performing 
illocutionary acts and the ways of 
locutionary acts. The followings are the 
results and types of normative features 
those that support how such normativity 
is generated in performing speech 
acts.The followings are subtypes of the 
assertive found in lines (1--14): 
(1)  
TG 1: Ndeq araq sarat dengan saq 
          rujuq. (affirming) 
         No-D there-adv requirement-n 
people-n who-pron reconciliation 
         There is no requirement for 
people to reconcile. 
(2)  
TG1: Sekalipun pegawean halal, saq 
aren beseang nuq kurang bagus. 
(describing) 
        Though-P action-n allowed-A, 
What-RP called-v 
divorce-n not- good-A. 
         Though it is an allowed action, 
what is called divorce is not 
good. 
(3)  
TG1: Lamun wah rujuq nuq wajib 
beng hak untuk senine. 
(explaining) 
     If-conj already-adv reconcile-v 
obligatory-A give-v right-n for-P wife-
n 
     If a husband has been reconciled, it 
is obligatory to give the right for his 
wife  
(4)  
TG 2: Ndeq arak dengan ndek mele 
bagus leq dunia niq. 
(concluding) 
    No-adv there-adv not-adv want-v 
good-A in-P world-n this-D 
    Everyone wants to be good in this 
world. 
(5)  
TG2: Due model dengan berjamaah. 
(describing/categorizing) 
    Two-D model-n pray together-PV 
    There are two models of praying 
together. 
Casual conversation (CC) 
(6)  
C: Kan mako gecok talet wayah nuq. 
(asserting) 
Cut tobacco-NP plant-v parent-n 
     Cutting the tobacco planted by your 
parents. 
(7) 
 A: Mahen mako gecok. (stating) 
      Expensive-A cut tobacco-NP 
      Cutting tobacco is expensive. 
(8)  
A: Timak mako gecok, mun selamet 
jaq, beleq mauk keping endah. 
(remarking) 
     Though-conj cut tobacco-NP, If-
conj successful-A, much-D money-n 
      Though it is just cutting tobacco, if 
it is successful, we earn much money. 
(9)  
A:  Ndeq iniq ngkah saqit semeniq 
onos anuq geres julun wiq nuq. 
(telling) 
    Not-adv can-mod heal-v back-n 
beacause of-PP carrying-ger sand-n 
day before yesterday 
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My back cannot heal because I was 
carrying away the sand the day 
before    yesterday. 
(10)  
A: Saq tokon-tokon meni ampoq 
berirap. (telling/informing) 
    When-adv sitting-ger felt-v 
    When I am just sitting like this, it 
feels painful. 
(11)  
E: Nun, jaq mulen. (agreeing) 
    Yes-adv it-pron does-mod 
    Yes, it does. 
(12)  
A: Dunie nik congok congo:::k lat to 
bih mate. (warn) 
     World-n this-D sit-v later-adv all-
pron die-v 
     Just sit now, in this world later we 
all die. 
(13)  
D: Sugih jari belian nane. (remark) 
     Rich-A be-aux dukun-n now 
     It is rich to be a dukun now.  
(14)  
A: Mun begadang jaq becat kurang 
daraq. (concluding) 
     If-conj stay up-PV high-adv low-A 
blood-n 
     If you stay up, it makes low blood 
pressure. 
In performing an assertion as in 
line (1--14), the speaker has a right to 
assert that (p), the S has an obligation to 
the truth of (p) and so on. In this case, 
the S' right, obligation, responsibility, 
and the H' right are both generated from 
agents altering the normative standing. 
Performing assertion involves 
intentional states (beliefs) of the S and 
the H, as well as normative dimensions 
generated from agents having right, 
obligation and responsibility. In the 
performance of assertion as in lines (1--
14), the followings are normative 
features of assertions: 
1. The S has an obligation to his 
argument asserted in the utterance  
2. The S is responsible for his position 
if the assertion is failed to obtain the 
truth of proposition 
3. The H has the right to correct/ blame 
if the S' statement is not true 
4. The H has an obligation to believe 
the S' claim (TG) 
Imperatives  
(17) Lalo ngeraos pacu-pacu. 
(suggesting) 
 Go-v talks-n truly-adv 
 Go to who talks truly. 
(18)     Mun talaq telu, ndeqte kanggo  
tulakang saq ndeq man saq nine 
nuq merariq  
if-con third-A divorce-not-adv 
allowed reconciling-v before-P 
woman-n marry-v  
malik bekeq dengan lain. 
(prohibiting) 
again-adv with-P Another-pron 
It is not allowed to reconcile 
with a woman and get 
remarried with the same man if 
it was the third divorce. 
(19) Wajib dore nae dengan nine 
mun ragu penggitan atau ndeq 
naedemen sujud. (order) 
Obligatory-A leg-n woman-n 
if-conj uncovered or-cond 
nor-adv 
It is obliged for women to 
check her legs if she is 
worried whether her legs are 
covered or not during bowing. 
(20)  Mun makmum nuq redo 
tepebelok ayat, sunat imam nuq 
pebelok ayat. (order) 
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If-conj congregation-n willing-
A lengthen-v verse-n, sunnah-n 
imam-n lengthen-v verse-n 
If the congregation is willing 
the verse to be lengthened, it is 
sunnah for imam to lengthen 
the verse.  
(21) E:// angetang aik Awe tan! (order) 
Boil-v water-n 
Boil the water, Awe! 
(22) C: Coba orah angkaq! 
(suggesting) 
Try-v massage-n 
Try to get the massage! 
(23)A: Masih ngoven mako to? 
(question as request) 
Still-adv cutivate-v tobacco-n 
Do you still dry tobacco in the 
oven? 
D: Masih 
Still-adv 
still 
(24) A: Dendeq ndeq e gawek tie. 
(order/prohibiting) 
Not-adv do-v that-pron 
Don’t do that! 
(25) A: Jagaq kakenan kance pikiran. 
(suggesting) 
Control-v food-n and-conj 
thought-n 
Control food and thought! 
(26) D: Endeng tulung beliang 
gorengan aloh! 
please-exc buy-v fried food-NP 
Please, buy fried food! 
(27) F: enteh awe milu lalo meli. 
(inviting) 
Let-v Awe-PN join-v buy-v 
Awe, let me join to buy. 
(28) A: Apika:::n entan= laun tegoroke 
sik dengan. (advise) 
Careful-A later-adv slaughter-v 
by-P other-pron 
Be careful! You will be 
slaughtered byothers. 
 
In case of imperatives as in lines 
(17--28), there are different ways of 
acquiring normative features. For 
instance, in lines (18--20), the order 
given is performed by TG invoke their 
standing power as a religious person. To 
be successful, the performance needs a 
specialized normative standing of the 
TG by cultural and social stipulation. 
The special feature of order given by the 
TG in line (18), the S lays an obligation 
not only to the H but also to the S to do 
p. To see how that order put a duty on 
the S himself is from a second person's 
standpoint that will be discussed further 
in the next unit. The normative standing 
generated in performing the speech act 
is by the way of the agent’s normative 
standing. The S has the right to put an 
obligation on himself on the Hto do the 
action in the future (the TG' order). The 
followings are normative features in 
performing commisive: 
1. The S has a conditional right to get 
the H do something (authority, 
prudential, practice based). 
2. The S has a conditionally generated 
obligation to believe that the H has 
the ability, possibility and willing 
to do the action. 
3. The S has a generated obligation to 
believe that the S has the ability, 
the possibility and willing to do the 
action. 
4. The S is responsible to proceed 
again if the S has no belief that the 
H has the ability, possibility and 
willingness to do the action. 
5. The S is responsible to be corrected 
if the S has no belief of his ability, 
possibility and willingness to do 
the action. 
6. The H has a conditional right to 
correct the H is there is no belief of 
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his ability, possibility and 
willingness to do the action. 
7. The H has an actual generated 
obligation if he believes he has the 
ability and possibility to do the 
action (the order). 
8. The H has a conditionally 
generated obligation if he believes 
in his ability, possibility and 
willingness to do that action 
(suggestion, inviting, giving 
advice, and making a request). 
Expressives  
(29)  
TG1: Assalamualaikum 
warrahmatullahibaraqatuh. 
(Greet/pray) 
         Peace be upon you! 
(30)  
TG1: Tunas maaf lamun araq salaq   
dalam atur tiang. (apologize) 
         Beg-v pardon-n if conj there-adv 
mistake-n in-P my speech-NP 
         I beg your pardon if there is 
mistake in my speech. 
(31)  
TG2: Yang tiang hormati bapak-
bapak/ibu-ibu. (respect) 
          That-adv I-pron respect-v  
          His excellence mr/mrs. 
(32)  
TG2: Mudah-mudahan arak manfaat. 
(well-wish/pray)  
          hope-v goodness-n 
          I wish there is goodness. 
(33)  
TG2: Terima kasih atas perhatiannya. 
(thank) 
         Thank-excla for-P attention-n 
your 
         Thanks for your attention. 
Casual conversations (CC) 
(34) 
A:      ee sakit ne. (painful) 
          Painful-A it-pron 
          It is painful. 
(35) 
C:      Mudah mudahan saq pade 
tekican selamet. (well-wish/pray) 
          May-mod all-pron safe-n 
          May all be safe. 
(36)  
A:      Sale sale doang tie. (criticize) 
wrong-A just-adv it-pron 
          It is just wrong. 
(37)  
C:      Kesengeh ambun parfum, Gus. 
(compliment) 
Fragrant-A smell-v parfume-n 
Your perfume smells so fragrant, 
Agus. 
 
Regarding performing ex-
pressives as in lines (29--37), the S has 
the right to express his attitude to the H. 
The S has an obligation to the truth of 
the psychological state expressed and 
the rest is not only derived from the act 
itself, but also from agents: having 
right, obligation, and responsibility. 
The followings are the normative 
properties of performing expressive. 
1. The S has the right to express 
something to the H. 
2. The S has an obligation to the truth 
of the psychological states 
expressed. 
3. The S is responsible for failing the 
truth of psychological states 
expressed. 
4. The H has an obligation to respond 
to the S'psychological states. 
5. The H has the right to express 
reproach/ correcting the S is he 
fails to fulfill the truth of 
psychological states expressed. 
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Commissive 
(38)  
B: Lemak bian jam-jam 7 lalo bejango 
ojoq Selong. (promising) 
    Tomorrow-adv evening-adv time-n 
go-v look out-PV to-P Selong-n 
    Tomorrow evening we go to look 
out to Selong around 7. 
D: Aoq wah. (accepting/confirming) 
     ok-adv 
     OK. 
(39) 
B: Bareh e ngeronde kance batur-
batur nuq. (promising) 
     Tonight-adv I-pron will-mod patrol 
with-P friends-n 
Tonight, I will patrol with my 
friends. 
B:  ed pade sugun bareh ngeronde 
menu? 
    Will-mod you-pron all-pron patrol-v 
    Will you all patrol tonight? 
C: Aok. Bareh ke sugun malik jam-jam 
12. (promising) 
         Yes-adv, tonight I-pron will-mod 
go out-PV again-adv time-n 
         Yes, I will go to patrol around 12 
tonight.  
A:      =aok 
          Yes-adv 
          Yes. 
(40) 
 B: Mun sehat jaq, e puase seminggu. 
If-conj recover-v, I-pron fast-v a 
week-adv 
If I recover, I will fast for a week. 
In case of commisive as in lines 
(38--40), the alteration of normative 
standing in performing a promise 
generates: the S' right to put himself in 
an obligation to do the action; the S and 
the H have an obligation to do them p 
(for collective-intention and we-
commitment), the S has an obligation to 
do the action p (for I intention and I-
commitment) and so on. Some of 
normative features in the performance 
of commisive are: 
1. The S has the right to put a 
promise obligation on himself 
if the condition in the clause is 
fulfilled (I-commitment). 
2. The S and the H has the right to 
put an obligation on themselves 
for their promise (we-/i-
commitment) 
3. The S has an obligation to do as 
promised in the proposition. 
4. The S and the H have an 
obligation to do the action in 
the future as promised in the 
proposition. 
5. The S is responsible for 
correcting, blaming if the his 
promise fails to be fulfilled.  
(involving his intention). 
6. The S and the H are responsible 
for blaming if they fail to fulfill 
the promise. 
7. The H has the right to correct 
the S if the promise is not being 
fulfilled. 
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8. The S is obligated to control/ 
reproach if he fails to fulfill his 
promise. 
The generated or derivative 
nature of such normative dimensions 
also occur in declarative.  
(41) B: Kafir uah (ahmadiyah).  
 (naming)  
Unbeliever-n 
They are unbelievers. 
 
By the way of performing 
declarative as in line( 41) the S has the 
right to declare and alter the states of 
affairs. The S has an obligation to alter 
the states of affairs. As indicated in line 
(41), the S has no right to declare such 
a status alteration. Hence, the 
declarative example in this study is 
successful, but defective. Some 
normative types of declarative: 
 
1. The S has the right to alter the 
states of affairs being declared. 
2. The S has an obligation to alter 
the states of affairs. 
3. The S has a responsibility if the 
requirement in the declaration 
is not fulfilled. 
4. The H has the right to 
correct/blame if the S has no 
authority to declare. 
Intentionality has a crucial role 
for the describing agent’s mental state 
in performing speech acts. The reason 
for this is that intentionality has a 
psychological mode and propositional 
content. Furthermore, intentional states 
involved in speech acts are 
représentations of its condition of 
satisfaction and the direction of fit. In 
performing assertion as in lines (1--14), 
the speaker asserts the truth of the 
proposition grounded on his belief. The 
speaker's belief is the intentional state 
of assertion. Since intention has a 
psychological mode (S) and 
representation content (r) or S (r). As in 
line 1, the S asserted that there is no 
requirement for reconciliation. In this 
case, the S' belief as psychological 
mode or intentional state in assertion 
impose its direction of fit, while the 
representation content impose the 
condition of satisfaction (truth) on the 
condition of satisfaction (S' utterance). 
For this above reason, the assertion is 
true if the propositional /representation 
content is true. In case of the belief, it 
imposes the direction of fit, the content 
of assertion matches reality. So 
assertion has an intentional state, 
direction of fit and condition of 
satisfaction. 
In case of performing imperatives 
as in lines (17--28), the intentional state 
is the S' desire or want. For instance, in 
line (21), the S wants the H to boil 
water. The S wants something by 
ordering the H to do that p. The 
condition of satisfaction is imposed by 
the representation content viz. The H 
obeys the order. Meanwhile, the 
direction of fit imposed by its 
psychological mode, the S desire or 
want is that the H do the action p to 
match the S' order. The properties of 
condition of satisfaction and direction 
of fit to other types of imperatives like 
suggesting, request, inviting, advising 
are similar to giving an order. 
Another type of IA that has the 
same direction of fit with imperative is 
commissive. The direction of fit of 
commissive as in lines(38-40) is world 
to word. It is determined by its 
representation content. In the 
performance of commissive, its 
intentional states are intentions. This 
intentional state imposes the direction 
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of fit of commissive. Meanwhile, the 
condition of satisfaction (COS) of 
commissive in case of giving a promise 
is the S' fulfillment of his intention to do 
p. 
In regards to expressive as in lines 
(29--37), the performing of expressive 
has no intentional state expressed. Thus, 
expressive has no either direction of fit 
and condition of satisfaction. Rather, 
the truths of psychological states 
expressed are presupposed to the given 
belief. For instance, in line (36) the S 
criticizes that it is wrong for the hearer 
to be fake shaman. This expression 
involves the S' belief that is p. This 
indicates that such an expression is 
grounded on a given belief as the 
presupposition of the truth of 
propositional states expressed. 
As for the last type, performing 
declarative in line (38), the intentional 
state is either a belief, a desire or a want 
to alter the state of affair. Thus, 
declarative has  double direction of fit. 
In this case, to be successful, the S has 
to have a belief (↓) and his desire (↑) to 
change a status. These double 
intentional states make a declarative to 
have double direction of fit (↕). 
4.2 Reason For Performing 
Speech Acts 
The importance of reasons for 
action is completely related to giving 
the relationship of facts, human mind, 
and normative fact to the action. 
Reasons for action in terms of 
performing speech acts are grounded on 
facts, intentional states and normative 
entity (or factitive entity borrowed from 
Searle). In performing speech acts, the 
reasons for action include all the 
factitive entities or at least intentional 
states and normative entity. The 
followings are the results of reasons for 
action found in the study in terms of 
factitive entity as a valid reason for 
action. 
1. Assertive 
Reasons for performing 
assertion found include facts, 
intentional states and normative facts. 
For instance in line  
(1)  Ndeq araq sarat dengan saq rujuq. 
(asserting) 
No-D there-adv requirement-n 
people-n who-pron reconcilation 
‘There is no a requirement for 
people to reconcile.’ 
Intentional state:  
 S believe that p is true.  
So asserting Bel (p) 
Normative facts:  
 The S has an obligation to believe 
that p is true. 
 The S has an obligation for making 
the H believe that p is true. 
 The S lays an obligation on the H 
to make him believe that p is true. 
In this case, the assertion 
performed by TG includes intentional 
state and a normative fact as the reasons 
for action in performing it. These 
reasons for action are similar to other 
subtypes of assertive as in lines (2--14) 
involving both reasons for action. 
However, as indicated in lines (5, 8, 14), 
the truth of proposition is conditional 
since the its truth is subject to 
fulfillment of the if-clause. However, 
the normative fact that put an obligation 
on either the S or the H believing that 
the truth of p not conditional. Thus, the 
S' belief as intentional states that the 
truth of proposition is conditional is not 
the same with the S' obligation to 
believe that p is true or the S has an 
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obligation to make the H believe that p 
is a conditional truth. 
2. Imperative 
As indicated in lines (17--28), to 
perform the subtypes of imperative is 
the most reason for action such as 
intentional states and normative facts. 
Its intentional states and normative fact 
of given subtypes as follow: 
17)  
TG1: Lalo ngeraos pacu-pacu. 
(suggesting) 
          Go-v talks-n truly-adv 
          Go to talks truly. 
 
Intentional states:  
 The S wants the H to do something 
(p).  
So suggestingW (p). 
Normative facts:  
 The S has an obligation to the H to 
do the action (p). 
 The S and the H both have an 
obligation to do the action (p). 
 The S and the H are responsible for 
not to do the action (p). 
 
(18)   
TG1: Mun talaq telu, ndeqte kanggo 
  if-con third-A divorce-not-adv 
allowed  
tulakang saq ndeqman saq nine nuq  
reconciling-v before-P woman-n 
marry-v malik bekeq dengan lain. 
(prohibiting) 
again-adv with-P Another-pron 
 
‘It is not allowed to reconcile before 
the woman get married with another 
if it is the third divorce.’ 
 
Intentional states:  
The S believes that p is true and 
want the H to do something (p). 
So prohibiting Bel (p) &W (p). 
Normative facts:  
 The S has an obligation to the H to 
do that (p). 
 The S and the H have an obligation 
to do that (p). 
 The S and the H are responsible for 
not to do that (p). 
 
(19)  
TG2: Wajib dore nae dengan nine mun  
     Obligatory-A leg-n woman-n if- 
conj 
ragu pengitan atau ndeq nae  
    doubt-adj uncovered or-cond nor-
adv 
          demen sujud. (order) 
          during-prep sujud-n 
‘It is an obligation for a woman to 
check her legs if she is worried 
whether her legs are covered or 
not during sujud.’ 
Intentional states:  
 The S believes that (p) and want 
the H to do that (p).  
So ordering Bel (p) & W (p). 
Normative facts:  
 The S has an obligation for the 
truth of that (p)  
 The S lays an obligation tothe H to 
do that (p). 
 The H (woman) has an obligation 
to do that (p). 
 The S is responsible for the truth of 
that (p)  
 and H is responsible for not to do 
that (p). 
21)  
E:// Angetang aik Awe tan! (order) 
      Boil-v water-n 
      Boil water, Awe! 
Intentional states:  
 The S wants the H to do that (p). 
So orderW (p). 
 
Normative facts: 
 The S has the right to lay an 
obligation to the H to do that (p). 
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 The H has an obligation to do that 
(p). 
 The H is responsible for not to do 
that (p). 
 
3. Commissive 
Performing speech acts like 
making a promise or making a demand 
the S' intention is in order to be 
successful and a sincere promise. 
However, it is not sufficient to explain 
the reason for action. The followings 
are reasons for action when performing 
a promise as in lines (38, 40). 
(38)  
B: Lemak bian jam-jam 7 lalo      
Tomorrow-adv evening-adv time-n 
go-v   
     bejango ojoq Selong. (promising) 
     look out-PV to-P Selong-n 
     Tomorrow evening we go to look 
out for Selong around 7. 
D: Aoq wah. (accepting/confirming) 
     ok-adv 
     OK 
Intentional states:  
 The S and the H believe that it is 
possible to that p i.e to go to look 
out  and S intend to (p). 
So we-promising S & H Bel (◊ 
p) & W (p). 
Normative facts:  
 The S and the H have an obligation 
to their belief that is possible to do 
(p). 
 The S and the H have an obligation 
to do that p. 
 The S and the H are responsible for 
not being (p) and not want to do 
(p). 
 The S and the H have theright to 
remind if the S or the H do not 
keep their promises. 
 
40)  
B: Mun sehat jaq, e puase seminggu. 
If-conj recover-v, I-pron fast-v a 
week-adv 
If I recover, I will fast for a week. 
Intentional states:  
 The S' belief is it is possible for 
him to do (p) and wants to do that 
(p). 
So, I-promisingS Bel (◊ p) and 
W (p) if (q). 
Normative fact:  
 The S has an obligation if his belief 
on that (p) if q (if I recover) is 
fulfilled. 
 The S is responsible to his belief on 
the truth of being not (p). 
 
Based on lines 38 and 40, the 
reasons for action differ in terms of 
intentional states and normative entity. 
In line (39), its intentional state is a 
collective belief and wants to do that 
(p). Furthermore, its normative entity is 
a collective obligation and 
responsibility. On the contrary, as in 
line (40), its intentional state is an 
individual belief and wants to do that 
(p). Meanwhile, its normative entity is 
an individual obligation and 
responsibility. These indicate that it is 
the We-intention and obligation 
(commitment) in line (39), while it is I-
intention and I-obligation in line (40). 
In addition to case line (40), the content 
of proposition is also conditional. In 
other words, for its intentional state, the 
S believes that it is possible to do that 
(p) and wants to do that (p) if 
conditional sentence is fulfilled (if (q). 
4. Expressive 
Dealing with expressive, reasons 
for action include facts, intentional 
states and normative entity. The 
followings are reasons for action of 
expressive. The cases of expressive are 
in lines (29--37) 
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(30)  
G1: Tunas maaf lamun araq salaq 
dalam  Beg-v pardon-n if conj 
there-adv mistake-n in-P  
  atur  tiang. (apologize) 
my speech-NP 
 
        I beg your pardon if there is 
mistake in my speech. 
Intentional states:  
 The S believes to do that p and 
wants (~p). 
So, apologizingBel (p) and W 
(~p). 
 
Normative fact: 
 The S is responsible for that (~p) 
 
(31)  
TG2: Yang tiang hormati bapak- 
That-adv I-pron respect-v  
bapak/ibu-ibu. (respect) 
ladies and gentleman-pron 
His excellence mr/mrs 
Intentional states:  
S believes to the truth of (p) and want 
to that (p). 
So, respectingBel (p) & W (p) 
(33)  
TG2: Terima kasih atas perhatiannya. 
(thanking) 
Thank-excla for-P attention-n 
your 
Thanks for your attention. 
Intentional states:  
 The S believes that the H has done 
something beneficial for the S and 
wants to that (p). 
So thankingBel (p) and W (p) 
Normative fact:  
 The S has an obligation to believe 
that (p) and to do that (p). 
(35)  
C: Mudah mudahan saq pade tekican  
May-mod all-pron  
selamet. (well-wish-pray) 
safe-n 
May all be safe. 
Intentional states: 
 The S believes in a future truth of 
an event (p) and to that (p). 
So, prayingBel (p) and W (p) 
Normative fact:  
 The S and the H have a collective 
obligation to the truth of something 
p. 
(36) A: Sale sale doang tie. (criticize) 
 wrong-A just-adv it-pron 
It is just wrong. 
Intentional states:  
 The S believe to that (p) is not 
good and don't want the H to do 
that (p) and believing someone is 
responsible for such and such 
(p).So, criticizingBel (p) and W 
(~p) and Bel (H is responsible if 
that (p)) 
Normative fact:  
 The S has an obligation for the 
truth of (p). 
(37) 
C: Kesengeh ambun  parfum,Gus. 
(compl) 
       Fragnant-A smell-v parfume-n 
      Your perfume smells so fragrant, 
Agus. 
Intentional states:  
 The S believes to that (p) and 
wants to that (p) 
 So, complimentBel (p) and W 
(p) 
Normative fact:  
 The S has an obligation for the 
truth of (p). 
 
As indicated in line (30) above, 
the reasons for action involves 
intentional states (believing (p) and 
want (~p). in other words, the reason for 
action is a belief that it is possible for 
him to make a mistake during the 
speech and he does not have the 
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intention to make one. It means the S' 
belief on the truth of psychological state 
is expressed, presupposed the truth of 
states. Furthermore, the reason for 
action derives from normative that is 
the S has an obligation to believe that is 
possible for him to make a mistake. As 
other lines above indicated, most 
subtypes of expressive, the reason for 
action is either intentional states or 
normative entity in performing it. 
5. Declarative 
In these types, declarative is a 
unique type of speech having double 
directions of fit and without sincerity 
conditions. The following is the only 
example of declarative found in casual 
conversation. 
(41)  
B: Kafir uah (ahmadiyah). (naming)  
     Unbeliever-n 
    They are unbelievers. 
Fact:  
 Ahmadiyah violate the 
Islamicprinciples 
Intentional states:  
 The S believes that the Ahmadiyah 
follower violates the essence 
ofIslam' principles and the S wants 
to alter its status by calling the 
person ‘unbeliever. So, 
NamingBel (p) & W (p) 
 
Normative fact:   
 The S has an obligation to the truth 
of (p). 
 The S is responsible for the belief 
if it is not true  
 
In this case, the S succeeded to 
state his belief  (p), but the S failed to 
change the status of Ahmadiyah based 
on his wants. This indicates that the 
reason for the S to perform it is 
geounded on the fact violation of the 
Islamic principle by ahmaiyah; and his 
intentional state viz. belief to that (p) 
and wants to change the state of 
Ahmadiyah by naming him as an 
unbeliever; and his normative reason is 
his obligation to the truth of that p. 
In order to be successful in 
declarative, the S presuppose the 
institutional fact existing by the way of 
collective recognition and acceptance. 
Using institutional facts (religious 
board, school etc), we collectively 
impose the status function of someone 
or an institution. These facts have 
standing power or authority of 
generated standing right for certain 
people depending on contexts.  This is 
the only way when a declarative can be 
successful and non-defective. Thus, in 
line (40), the S who has no power or 
authority included three sources of 
reasons, but still failed to name a 
collective belief. Furthermore, that 
failure is caused by S declaration 
grounded only on his individual belief 
and desire to that p. 
 
5. Conclusion and Suggestion 
All normative dimensions of any 
subtypes of illocutionary acts are moral. 
Such moral aspects include actual and 
conditional moral right; actual and 
conditional moral obligation; and actual 
and conditional moral responsibility. 
However, in case of comissive and 
declarative, the subtypes found are so 
limited that it is far from an adequate 
description of its normative and moral 
dimensions. 
Above all the natures of 
normative and moral dimensions are 
generated; they're related to other 
factitive entities like facts (brute and 
institutional facts) and intertwined with 
the practical reason foraction. 
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Generative characteristic of normative 
and moral dimensions are results from 
an agent having right, obligation, and 
responsibility. Actions are altered by an 
agent when performing speech acts for 
the H. Furthermore, intentional states 
include belief, want, and intention 
corresponding to types of speech acts 
those are also influenced by fact, 
normative and moral reason for actions. 
In other words, such factitive entities 
are both internal and external. 
Finally, the moral dimensions of 
speech acts having moral values might 
be an arena for moral or character 
education. If moral aspects exist in 
speech acts, there are moral values 
generated. Thus, as indicated in 
findings and discussion a number of 
moral values pertains to any types of 
speech acts such as honesty, credibility, 
truth, obedience, self-respect, concern 
for others, and the rest could be taught 
to children or students. In this case, 
teachers, family, and community need 
to cooperate to build a moral character 
by ways of giving an understanding on 
a set of essential conditions of speech 
acts, including moral dimensions 
embedded to speech acts. The 
motivation for taking such morality of 
speech acts is the arena of moral and 
character education as for universality, 
accessibility, and practical reasons. In 
addition, moral values embedded in 
speech acts cover the core values that 
are necessarily to be addressed in 
character education such as reasoning, 
attitude, and good behavior. 
Based on the limited concern of 
the study, it is needed to do further 
studies on analyzing the illocutionary 
force indicating device of different 
languages, indirect speech acts and 
other context of speech acts for 
increasing description and explanation 
on the basis of empirical linguistics. 
Second, the normative and moral 
dimensions of speech acts are complex 
things, therefore any relevant concepts 
to those notions like freedom, 
rationality, motivation, and the rest are 
in need of further scrutiny in order to 
have a more comprehensive argument. 
Finally, the moral values of speech 
identified are far more from adequate 
identification in terms of modeling, 
principles, assessment, and 
management. Those need further 
analysis to provide an adequate 
foundation of moral and character 
education in every context and 
discipline. 
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